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Introduction 
Dissuasion—as put forward in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and other recent U.S. 
strategy documents—is targeted at states. Although there are questions about the potential role 
and efficacy of dissuasion with respect to states, there is an even more difficult question: Can it 
apply at all to terrorists and other non-state actors? 
Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept  
Dissuasion was put forward in the QDR as one of four U.S. strategic goals. The QDR refers to 
dissuasion as follows: 
Through its strategy and actions, the United States influences the nature of future military 
competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complicates military planning for potential 
adversaries in the future. Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries 
from initiating future military competitions. The United States can exert such influence through the 
conduct of its research, development, test, and demonstration programs. It can do so by 
maintaining or enhancing advantages in key areas of military capability. Given the availability of 
advanced technology and systems to potential adversaries, dissuasion will also require the 
United States to experiment with revolutionary operational concepts, capabilities, and 
organizational arrangements and to encourage the development of a culture within the military 
that embraces innovation and risk-taking. To have a dissuasive effect, this combination of 
technical, experimental, and operational activity has to have a clear strategic focus.[2] 
This concept was referenced or reiterated in other U.S. strategy documents, including the 
National Security Strategy of the United States. Dissuasion, like the other three strategic goals 
promulgated in the QDR, was advanced in the context of states. Dissuasion was to prevent 
political adversaries—including aspiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferants as well 
as possible peer competitors—from engaging in arms races or other direct military competitions 
with the United States through dominant U.S. military power. 
There are other means to dissuade adversaries—both political-military and diplomatic—but these 
are not directly addressed in the Bush Administration’s strategy. Attention should also be paid to 
the dissuasive effects of what Joseph Nye termed “soft power.”[ 3] Neither the concept of 
dissuasion nor the tools to realize it are well developed, and the prospects of dissuasion are 
unclear.  
To the extent that realizing dissuasion as a strategic objective is achievable, three approaches 
should be considered: first, ensure the entry cost/threshold for competition are too high; second, 
eliminate any benefits ensuing from competition; and third, increase the negative consequences 
of competition. These approaches will be difficult to undertake, and uncertain of success. But, if 
they can be achieved, dissuasion may become an important arrow in the U.S. strategic quiver. 
Dissuasion and Deterrence  
Dissuasion is closely connected to deterrence (as is clear from the second and third approaches 
put forward above). This link is primarily to deterrence by denial, rather than by punishment, 
which is also directed at states. The boundaries between dissuasion and deterrence by denial are 
difficult to draw. Both come into play where, and to the extent that, U.S. military capabilities, 
including active and passive defenses, make the pursuit of an activity against the United States, 
its friends and allies pointless or even counterproductive. One way to differentiate the two 
concepts is to consider dissuasion to be focused on preventing the acquisition of a capability, and 
deterrence by denial on precluding its use. In this sense, dissuasion could potentially address an 
area where deterrence and other measures have fallen short —i.e., the acquisition of military 
capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However this conceptual approach 
may not capture all the possibilities and, in any case, also raises questions. 
Can Terrorism be Dissuaded?  
It would appear that dissuasion would likely be wholly or largely irrelevant to the emerging threat 
of terrorism. Overwhelming U.S. military dominance may lead other states to eschew competition 
in key areas, but in some cases it has resulted in asymmetric threats by states. Historically, the 
might of states has been a spur for their opponents to use terrorism as an asymmetric response. 
And the dominance across a full spectrum of military and other capabilities exhibited by the 
United States since the end of the Cold War has led adversaries to use terrorism—a classic 
asymmetric response. 
There is, of course, no possibility of a terrorist network competing with the United States in the 
literal sense of seeking equality. However, like states, terrorists may seek weapons of mass 
destruction capabilities as the surest means to oppose the United States—and may even believe 
the threat or use of such capabilities will affect U.S. behavior vis-à-vis the war on terrorism, 
regional interventions, detention of al Qaeda and other terrorist operatives, etc. If this perception 
holds, dissuasion of any kind will not be practicable. 
It is widely believed that one cannot dissuade terrorists and other non-state actors for the same 
reasons they are seen to be undeterrable: such as their lack of a “return address,” or for other 
reasons such as religious fanaticism of the terrorists. It does appear that while U.S. military might 
has killed terrorists and disrupted operations, it has not to date had a dissuasive effect on 
terrorism overall and, apparently as well, on terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. During 
the post-Cold War era marked by U.S. “unipolar” ascendancy, we have seen terrorism increase in 
deadliness, culminating in the first significant modern acts of WMD terrorism. But the 
assumptions behind this belief—that terrorism can not be deterred or dissuaded—may be flawed, 
as terrorists have to be somewhere, they have historically mimicked states in key areas and are 
thus subject to constraints and influences of various kinds. 
These considerations should not ignored—and, in any event, the record to date is not the final 
word. The objective of dissuasion is only newly articulated in strategic terms. And the war on 
terrorism, which can be expected to influence terrorist behavior, has only just begun in earnest. 
Both may develop in ways in which dissuasion of terrorists may appear credible. But credibility is 
just a precondition. There remains the issue of whether the strategy of terrorism, or, at least 
certain terrorist behavior, can be effectively dissuaded. From this perspective, even if unlikely to 
lead terrorists to forego terrorism, an effective dissuasion policy could affect terrorists’ decisions 
on specific targets and weapons. This may appear to be limited, but recall that dissuasion has 
issues with respect to its efficacy even in state contexts. 
Possibilities for Dissuading Terrorism  
It seems possible that one can, in principle, dissuade terrorists and other non-state actors. It is 
unlikely that dissuasion will be effective against all groups of terrorists or forms of terrorism. 
Currently operating terrorist are unlikely to be dissuaded at all, but perhaps potential or future 
terrorists could be dissuaded from at least some actions. Non-state supporters of terrorists, 
including terrorist financiers, can also be dissuaded, as can state supporters. 
If one had “infallible” intelligence and “absolute” security, if one could block all terrorist funding or 
remove all conditions conducive to the rise of terrorism, terrorists and their supporters would be 
unable to operate and presumably, over time, would be marginalized if not wholly eliminated. Of 
course, we will not have such capabilities, but continued improvements in all of these areas could 
effect at least some groups’ decisions to pursue terrorism or to receive the support they require 
for their operations. In particular, transforming command, control, communications, computing, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and, in particular, development of more 
capable human intelligence (HUMINT), may prove particularly critical. Homeland security and 
active and passive defenses, which inter alia seek to prevent or to limit the damage from terrorist 
attacks, are also important in this regard. 
In similar fashion, a targeted use of soft power could be used—not alone, but in conjunction with 
other instruments of power—to try to challenge terrorist ideology, expose or undercut supporters, 
weaken recruiting, etc. Programs designed to affect ideologies, financing and conditions 
conductive to terrorism are essential, including effective public diplomacy. Recognition of the 
promise of this approach, even if it is not directly or exclusively tied to dissuasion, appears to 
ground the National Security Strategy, where enhancing the development and use of soft power 
is more prominent than preemption doctrine. As well, this appears to be consistence with the 
sense of the UN goal of dissuading terrorism. According to Security-General Kofi Anan: "We must 
dissuade the would-be-perpetrators of terror by setting effective norms and implementing relevant 
legal instruments; by an active public information campaign; and by rallying international 
consensus behind the fight against terrorism. To achieve effective dissuasion, it is essential to 
remember that the fight against terrorism is above all a fight to preserve fundamental rights and 
sustain the rule of law."[4] 
Whether hard or soft, none of these actions will dissuade all terrorism, but, as suggested, they 
may dissuade some groups from some forms of terrorism. If dissuasion is designed to have an 
effect on acquisition of weapons, it must be noted that the weapons of terrorists, with the 
exception of at least some WMD, are readily obtainable. On the basis of this reasoning, to the 
extent that nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are more difficult to acquire, if 
dissuasion were to have an effect, it may be more likely to affect acquisition of these weapons 
than conventional terrorist capabilities. There is a parallel in the realm of states: for all of their 
weaknesses, nonproliferation efforts, at least in the nuclear sphere, have arguably been important 
to the largely successful efforts dissuading most states from acquiring these revolutionary 
weapons. This is unprecedented in military history. 
Possibilities for Dissuading WMD Terrorism  
If dissuading WMD terrorism appears to be more feasible than dissuading conventional terrorism, 
this is due to a number of factors. The technical and political obstacles to WMD terrorism may in 
themselves be dissuasive to some degree: Significant WMD capabilities in most cases are 
difficult either to produce or to disseminate (or both), they increase the prospects for detection or 
interdiction, and they may produce unintended, counterproductive results. 
Every effort needs to be made to increase these obstacles. Enhanced intelligence and security 
have a role here insofar as they make it possible to prevent, disrupt or mitigate the effects of an 
attack. But any action that looks to complicate the calculations of terrorists seeking WMD and, 
thereby, to increase the prospect of detection or to reduce the chances of operational success, 
could be dissuasive. In a similar fashion, any action that makes it more likely a WMD attack will 
not achieve the terrorists’ goals, or would be counterproductive, could have a dissuasive effect. 
How might these possibilities be realized? 
Targeting Non-State Actors  
Whether one thinks of terrorists themselves or the other non-state actors that could support them 
in acquiring WMD, including multinational corporations, black marketers, criminal organizations, 
etc., there may be scope for dissuasion. In all cases, U.S. military-technological superiority per se 
is not the most important element of a dissuasive strategy. 
Such a strategy would have to be clearly and publicly articulated in declaratory policy, and 
specifically target each non-state actor. There must be a multi-pronged effort to make these 
actors understand that their pursuit of WMD terrorism will not, in the end, succeed—because the 
terrorists will have difficulty acquiring significant capabilities; they will have difficulty using any 
capability they acquire; any WMD they use will not have the consequences they desire, and will 
provoke the harshest response imaginable to themselves and those who support them. 
Will such an effort bear fruit? It may, but as suggested, active terrorists may no longer be 
dissuadable. Other actors may be better targets of dissuasion. For example, multilateral or 
multinational entities that make key capabilities available to terrorists may, in principle, be 
dissuaded by a credible threat to deny their participation in the benefits of the global marketplace. 
Financiers and individuals with requisite weapons expertise might be dissuaded from assisting 
terrorists by criminalizing their activities and subjecting them to condign punishment. 
Targeting State Supporters and Sponsors  
To the extent that effective WMD terrorism, especially nuclear, may derive from states’ WMD 
programs, there may be additional scope for dissuasion. If you can dissuade WMD proliferators, 
you will reduce the prospect of WMD terrorism. As noted, overall nonproliferation efforts have had 
a dissuasive effect on most states. But the acquisition of WMD capabilities by certain states, such 
as aggressors or aspirants to global status, has been and continues to be difficult to deter and 
dissuade, particularly as these weapons, at least nuclear weapons, are seen to be an “equalizer” 
to U.S. power.  
However difficult, dissuading state proliferation appears essential if one hopes to dissuade WMD 
terrorism. It may be critical, especially for nuclear terrorism. This thought appears in the UN goal 
of “denial.” The Secretary-General called for, inter alia, “strengthening global norms against the 
use or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”[5] To underscore this point, he stated: 
“Given the levels of inhumanity to which modern-day terrorists have descended, efforts to curb 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have assumed new urgency.”[6]  
In similar fashion, state supporters and sponsors of terrorism can, in principle, be dissuaded as 
states. The uneven record to date of responses to states that support or sponsor terrorism raises 
some questions. Whatever their intended effect, the military operations in Afghanistan, and 
possibly Iraq, could offer concrete cases on which to base the dissuasion, as well as the 
deterrence, of future state sponsors. If it can be realized, dissuading state sponsors should have 
a disproportionate effect on WMD terrorism, which becomes more likely if weapons are 
transferred to terrorists, or if states provide terrorists with a secure operational base, 
technological and/or financial support. Consequently, it would appear that the goal of dissuasion 
of WMD terrorism needs to be pursued in conjunction with other objectives, using a wide range of 
tools. 
Differentiating WMD  
As we look at these possibilities more closely, it is important to address nuclear, radiological, 
chemical and biological threats separately. Such an approach can consider the significant 
differences in, and impacts of, these weapons, as well as the different instruments that can be 
brought to bear in each case: 
· Nuclear: A decision to undertake nuclear terrorism can, in principle, be dissuaded by 
keeping weapons, materials and expertise from the terrorists. Support for the 
international nuclear nonproliferation regime can help provide a legal and normative basis 
for dissuasion, but there is little reason to believe the regime in and of itself will affect the 
behavior of terrorists. Some regime and extra-regime elements, even if designed with 
states in mind, might do so. Improved non- and counterproliferation efforts, including 
enhanced export controls, safeguards, material protection, control and accountancy 
(MPC&A) and other cooperative threat reduction efforts, interdiction (via the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, or PSI), etc., can reduce the prospects of nuclear terrorism. Advances 
in R&D leading to the deployment of more effective technologies to detect, disable, and 
disarm nuclear weapons may enhance such efforts. If these measures pose significant 
challenges or obstacles to terrorists, they may effectively dissuade nuclear terrorism.  
· Radiological: Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs, or dirty bombs) do not pose the 
same technological challenges to terrorists as nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, tighter 
controls over radiological sources as well as enhancing damage limitation through the 
development/deployment of effective, cheap and quick cleanup technologies have the 
potential to dissuade radiological terrorism.  
· Bio/Chem: Chemical and biological agents/capabilities are in most cases too readily 
obtainable to effectively stop their spread at the source in the same way that nuclear 
materials can be. Nonetheless, significant chemical and biological terrorism can perhaps 
be dissuaded to some extent. Supporting multilateral treaties and other efforts in this area 
can be useful in providing legitimacy for dissuasive efforts, but only a few regime and 
extra-regime tools are likely to influence terrorists to any degree. Effective export 
controls, interdiction through PSI, etc., as well as R&D on detection and other capabilities 
can potentially be useful. The ability to limit damage through effective passive defenses 
offers potentially significant leverage, and appears to have direct parallels with dissuasive 
effects in states in this sphere.  
Conclusion  
The prospect of dissuading states is uncertain at best; dissuading terrorists and other non-state 
actors is even more so. Clearly, dissuasion must not be limited to its military-technological 
dimensions. Even if a multi-pronged approach is useful, it is unlikely to be the primary, or even a 
prominent, tool in dealing with terrorism, including WMD terrorism. It may not be effective in all 
cases—and perhaps not in any. Nonetheless, dissuasion could be an important tool for 
influencing terrorist decisions on using WMD, particularly if it can affect their decision to acquire 
these deadly weapons by leading terrorists to decide the pursuit of WMD terrorism will be slow, 
difficult and costly, and will not produce their desired results. This conclusion could, in principle, 
be reinforced by the additional threat of overwhelming punishment of terrorists, financiers, 
suppliers and state supporters of terrorists who seek to acquire and use WMD.  
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